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We examine the relationship between the optimal incentive contract and the ﬁrm’s
decision to ﬁre a manager for poor performance. We ﬁrst derive some theoretical results
using a simple principal-agent model, and then examine the empirical evidence on the
incidence of forced turnover among CEOs with diﬀerent compensation contracts. We
ﬁnd that CEOs with steeper compensation contracts (i.e., with greater incentives) are
more likely to be ﬁred following poor ﬁrm performance. Logit estimations indicate that
among ﬁrms that make a net loss in a given year, a CEO receiving incentives at the 60th
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percentile. The corresponding ﬁgure for ﬁrms whose ROA is below the industry average
level is 15.07%, and for ﬁrms whose stock return is below the market return is 15.86%.
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Do executives who receive greater performance incentives face greater performance pressure,
i.e., are they more likely to be ﬁred for poor performance? We ﬁrst study this question
within the principal-agent framework, and derive some results on the relationship between
the optimal incentive contract and the likelihood of forced turnover. We then examine the
empirical evidence on the incidence of forced turnover among CEOs with diﬀerent compen-
sation contracts. We ﬁnd that CEOs with higher incentives are also more likely to be ﬁred
for poor performance.
A simple analysis of the principal-agent problem suggests two quick answers to the ques-
tion posed in the opening paragraph. First, ﬁrms oﬀer incentives both directly through the
compensation contract1, as well as indirectly, through the threat of ﬁring. These two kinds
of incentives may be viewed as substitutes. In this case, ﬁrms that oﬀer steeper incentive
contracts, for example, with more shares and options, may be less likely to use the ﬁring
threat for incentive purposes. On the other hand, executive eﬀort is only one of the factors
inﬂuencing performance. Ability is another. Faced with poor performance, a ﬁrm might
attribute it to either low eﬀort or low ability. But while incentives may induce eﬀort, they
cannot induce ability. Thus, in light of poor performance, a ﬁrm that provides higher in-
centives to its managers is more likely to infer that the problem is one of ability rather
than eﬀort. In this case, ﬁrms providing higher incentives must be more likely to ﬁre their
managers for poor performance.
The two conﬂicting answers suggested above indicate that the issues of performance
1Firms oﬀer incentives by linking the compensation of executives to ﬁrm performance. They may do this
through performance-based bonuses, as well as through stocks and options. Over the last decade, equity
based incentives have largely outweighed performance bonuses as documented by Hall and Liebman (1998),
and Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2000).
1and turnover must be studied jointly with the issue of incentives, in an optimal contracting
framework2. Prior research in the area of executive compensation, incentives and man-
agement turnover has, however, tended to deal separately with the two main issues - (i)
executive compensation and whether it incentivizes better ﬁrm performance, and (ii) the
relationship between ﬁrm performance and forced management turnover. Coughlan and
Schmidt (1985), Murphy (1985, 1986), Abowd (1990), Jensen and Murphy (1990a) and
Leonard (1990) study the relationship between executive compensation contracts, incen-
tives and ﬁrm performance3. The papers show that ﬁrm performance is largely positively
related to pay-performance sensitivity, after controlling for the risk, i.e., the variance of per-
formance (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). Similarly Weisbach (1988), Warner, Watts and
Wruck (1988), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), Parrino
(1997), and Goyal and Park (2002) are among the papers studying how ﬁrm performance
aﬀects forced executive turnover, and the role played by corporate governance factors such
as board composition in determining this relationship. These papers indicate forced ex-
ecutive turnover is more likely following poor performance, and that greater insider share
ownership and higher insider representation on the board deter forced turnovers.
In this paper, we recognize that executive incentives and ﬁrm performance are jointly
related to executive turnover and analyze both jointly. First, we examine the properties
2Firms design executive compensation contracts to provide the right level of incentives for their execu-
tives, taking into account many features of the contracting environment such as the ease of monitoring the
management, the importance of unobservable factors etc. These same contractual environment variables
also endogenously determine whether and in what circumstances ﬁrms will ﬁre their top executives for poor
ﬁrm performance. Therefore, any empirical examination of how compensation is related to performance and
turnover must control for the incentive eﬀects of compensation. A related point is made by Himmelberg,
Hubbard and Palia (1999), who argue that both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously
determined in an optimal contracting framework.
3See Murphy, 1999 and Core, Guay and Larcker, 2001 for extensive surveys on this literature.
2of the optimal incentive contract in a simple multi-period principal-agent setting that ex-
plicitly incorporates forced turnover, i.e., ﬁring in the event of poor performance. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst model to study how the ﬁring option inﬂuences the design of the
incentive contract. (Holmstrom, 1982, 1999, and Gibbons and Murphy, 1992 are related
papers4) We examine how the slope of the optimal compensation contract changes between
the regime with ﬁring and the regime without ﬁring. Then, using data on CEO compen-
sation, we empirically test whether steeper compensation contracts are associated with a
greater probability of ﬁring in the event of poor performance. We summarize our model
and the empirical results below.
Our theoretical model examines the optimal incentive contract in the presence of career
concerns when the ﬁrm can ﬁre the manager for poor performance. In our model, executive
eﬀort and ability jointly determine output. Eﬀort is unveriﬁable which makes incentive
contracts necessary. Executive ability is uncertain, and the ﬁrm learns the ability of the
manager by observing his performance, i.e., ﬁrm output. Bayesian learning implies that a
higher level of eﬀort in the ﬁrst period leads to a lower posterior estimate of ability in the
event of a poor outcome (the learning eﬀect). If the posterior estimate of the manager’s
ability is suﬃciently low, the ﬁrm ﬁres him and switches to an interim CEO until another
full time CEO is hired. In equilibrium, ﬁrms oﬀer contracts that link pay to performance, as
well as specify whether the executive will be ﬁred or not in the event of poor performance.
The ﬁring threat (the stick) acts as a partial substitute for incentives (the carrot) in the
4Holmstrom (1982, 1999) shows that contracts may be necessary even in multiperiod settings where
career concerns may be expected to play a similar role. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) characterize optimal
incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns. They predict and verify that the optimal incentive
contracts should be steeper for executives who are closer to retirement. However, in their model, executive
tenure is deterministic - the executive is hired for a ﬁxed number of periods and retires at the end of her
tenure. In reality, executives are often ﬁred for poor performance, and thus, the executive’s tenure length
may be uncertain.
3ﬁrst period. If it increases ﬁrst period eﬀort suﬃciently, and if the learning eﬀect is strong
enough, then the slope of the optimal incentive contract with ﬁring will be less than that
without ﬁring. If, however, the threat does not increase eﬀort suﬃciently, then the optimal
incentive contract with ﬁring will be steeper than that without ﬁring. It is a matter for
empirical analysis to determine whether a contract that speciﬁes ﬁring is steeper than one
that does not.
In the empirical section of this paper, we examine whether CEOs with steeper incentive
contracts are more likely to be ﬁred following poor performance than CEOs with ﬂatter
contracts. We use data on CEO changes during the period 1993-1999 from the ExecuComp
database and, through an exhaustive news search, identify the reasons for the change. We
use two measures of incentives - the ﬁrst measure is the change in the dollar value of the
CEO’s stock and option holdings for a one percent change in the stock price (the Return
Sensitivity). It is a comprehensive measure of the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to ﬁrm
performance. We use the Core and Guay (1999a) method to calculate this measure, which
allows us to calculate incentives even using the partial details on the CEO’s stock option
portfolio contained in the annual proxy statements (see Appendix B). Our second measure
of incentives is the Dollar Sensitivity of CEO compensation, deﬁned as the change in the
dollar value of the CEO’s stock and option holdings for a dollar change in ﬁrm equity value.
For both measures of incentives, and for seven measures of poor performance, we ﬁnd
that CEOs with steeper incentive contracts are more likely to be ﬁred than those with
ﬂatter contracts, among poorly performing ﬁrms. Among ﬁrms that make a net loss in a
given year, a CEO receiving incentives at the 60th percentile level is 26.55% more likely to
be ﬁred than a CEO with incentives at the 40th percentile. The corresponding ﬁgure for
ﬁrms whose ROA is below the industry average level is 15.07%, and for ﬁrms whose stock
return is below the market return is 15.86%. The results are robust to various performance
4and incentive measures. Overall, our results indicate that CEOs with greater incentives
also face greater performance pressures.
Overall, our results indicate that CEOs with greater incentives also face greater perfor-
mance pressures. We do not argue that these eﬀects are very important from the manager’s
point of view. As Jensen and Murphy (1990a) point out, dismissals are not an important
source of managerial incentives. However, we do observe ﬁrms ﬁring their CEOs following
poor performance, and our intention is to understand how this is related to the issue of
incentives. We argue that if ﬁrms learn suﬃciently about the ability of a manager from
observing performance, then, they may ﬁre managers who perform poorly after being in-
centivized. Our empirical analysis bears this out. Firms do seem to consider the level of
incentives oﬀered in deciding on whether to penalize a CEO for poor performance.
The paper is organized as follows - section 2 presents our model of optimal incentive
contracts incorporating the ﬁring decision, section 3 describes the data set and our measures
of incentives and performance, section 4 describes the estimation and results, and section 5
concludes. Appendix A has the proofs of results derived in section 2 and appendix B
describes the method used in calculating portfolio sensitivities.
2 Optimal Incentive Contracts with Forced Turnover
Consider a simple model of interaction between an inﬁnitely lived ﬁrm and an agent who
lives for two periods5. The ﬁrm output yt in any period t is either zero or one with the
5The main intuition regarding the relationship between the slopes of the ﬁrst period contracts in the two
cases of ﬁring and rehiring, may be derived by comparing the ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) for the agent
and the ﬁrm in the two cases. In this paper, while we derive these FOCs for each case and compare them,
we do not solve for the exact contract in each case, since that does not add to the intuition required for the
empirical analysis to follow. Subramanian, Chakraborty and Sheikh (2002b) contains the full solution to
5agent’s ability and eﬀort determining the probability that the output is one. We may refer
to the event y = 1 as “success” and y = 0 as “failure”6. There are two types of agents,
those of high ability (type H) and those of low ability (type L). If the agent’s eﬀort level in
a given period is et, then,




et if type = H
®et if type = L,
(1)
where ® 2 [0;1). ® is thus a measure of the importance of ability over eﬀort in being a
successful manager. The closer ® is to one, the less important is ability in determining
managerial success.
Both the ﬁrm and the worker are risk-neutral, and have an intertemporal discount rate
of ±. The worker has a quadratic disutility of eﬀort g(e) = 0:5re2, where r is a shift param-
eter. The agent’s eﬀort is not veriﬁable, even if the ﬁrm can deduce the equilibrium level
of eﬀort. In order to induce eﬀort, the ﬁrm oﬀers incentive contracts of the form wt = btyt,
where wt is the wage in period t. The ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost F in each period that it
operates. If the agent is ﬁred, we assume that the ﬁrm has to wait for one period before
hiring a new agent. During this period, the ﬁrm works with an interim CEO and makes a
net proﬁt of zero. Thus, the normal proﬁts of the ﬁrm may be interpreted as being measured
relative to the potential proﬁts under an interim CEO (such as a retired CEO who is on the
board of directors). Equivalently, the ﬁxed cost F may be interpreted as the revenue under
a back-up CEO. The assumption that the ﬁrm waits for one full period before hiring a new
CEO simpliﬁes the dynamic optimization framework, without much loss of generality7.
the model.
6In the empirical analysis, we use a binary measure of performance in correspondence with the binary
nature of output in this model.
7It implies that in making the decision of the whether to ﬁre the agent or not, the ﬁrm has to consider
only the proﬁts in the agent’s second period and not in any of the future periods, since all agents retire after
two periods.
6The Contract: At hiring, the ﬁrm oﬀers a contract that speciﬁes: (1) Slopes fb1;b21g where
b21 is the slope of the second period contract when y1 = 1; and (2) Whether the manager
will be ﬁred or not if y1 = 0, and if not, the slope b20. Note that while the manager could
be ﬁred even if y1 = 1, condition 8 below will rule out this possibility. We will derive the
optimal contract in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We are primarily interested in the
properties of the slope b1 of this contract.
We begin with the Bayesian learning process by which a ﬁrm updates its beliefs about
the manager’s ability.
2.1 Bayesian Learning
As in Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Holmstrom (1982, 1999), there is symmetric, but
imperfect, information about the agent’s ability. The ﬁrm and the agent alike believe at the
beginning of the ﬁrst period that the agent is of type H with probability q > 0. Subsequently,
they update their beliefs based on the output observed in the ﬁrst period. Let q2j denote
the posterior probability that the agent is of type H when the ﬁrst period output is j. Given
the prior q, the eﬀort level e1, and the technology 1 above, we have
q20 = P(H j y1 = 0) =
q(1 ¡ e1)





q21 = P(H j y1 = 1) =
qe1
qe1 + (1 ¡ q)®e1
=
q
q + ®(1 ¡ q)
(3)
where z1 = q+(1¡q)®. It is easy to observe from equations 2 and 3 that (i) q20 · q < q21,
(ii)
dq21




Condition 4 implies that higher ﬁrst period eﬀort has a negative impact on the posterior
estimate of the agent’s ability in the event of failure. As we see below, this might play
7an important role in the optimization decision of the agent and the ﬁrm. If the eﬀect is
suﬃciently strong, then the ﬁrm might ﬁre the agent after the ﬁrst period, rather than
rehire him.
Next, we derive the optimal contract that the ﬁrm would oﬀer any rehired agent in the
second period, given the above learning process.
2.2 The Second Period Contract
Let j 2 f0;1g denote the ﬁrst period output. The ﬁrm oﬀers a second period incentive
contract b2j conditional on the ﬁrst period output. Let y2j denote the output in the second
period when y1 = j. Deﬁne z2j as follows:
z2j = q2j + (1 ¡ q2j)® = q2j(1 ¡ ®) + ®: (5)
The expected utility of the agent in the second period, conditional on ﬁrst period output,
is
u2j = ¡g(e2) + P(y2j = 1):b2j + P(y2j = 0):0 = ¡0:5re2
2 + z2jb2je2:




2 + z2jb2je2: (6)




The ﬁrm’s second period proﬁt Π2j conditional on ﬁrst period output is
Π2j = ¡F + P(y2j = 1):(1 ¡ b2j) + P(y2j = 0):0 = ¡F + z2je¤
2j(1 ¡ b2j):
Substituting for e¤
2j from above, the ﬁrm chooses b2j to solve
max
b2j






The following result characterizes the optimal second period contract.
8Result 1 The optimal contract in the second period is independent of ﬁrst period output
and is given by b¤
2 = 0:50. The optimal second period eﬀort level e¤
2j =
z2j
2r . ﬁrm’s expected









j 2 f0;1g is the ﬁrst period output.
Result 1 has two implications. First, it implies that the ﬁrm would not rehire the agent
if the ﬁrst period output is j and z2
2j < 4rF. From equation 5 and condition 4, we may see
that z20 · z1 < z21. In the following analysis, we will assume that:
z2
21 > 4rF (8)
in order to make the model interesting8. This ensures that all ﬁrms rehire the agent if the
ﬁrst period output is one.



















We may call this the learning eﬀect, as condition 9 highlights the eﬀect of learning on the
conditional expected second period utility and proﬁts. A higher ﬁrst period eﬀort biases
ability downward to a greater extent in the event of poor performance, leading to lower
conditional expected utility and proﬁts9. A strong enough learning eﬀect will imply that
Π20 < 0, so that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to ﬁre the agent for poor performance.
Next we solve for the optimal contract in the ﬁrst period. This depends on whether the
contract is accompanied by a ﬁring threat or by a commitment not to ﬁre. We solve for the
8Otherwise, the ﬁrm would ﬁre the agent even if the ﬁrst period output was one, which reduces the model
to a trivial case of a one period model.
9While the ﬁrm does not observe e1, it infers e1 from the equilibrium response of the agent to the contract
oﬀered.
9contract in the case with ﬁring in the following subsection, and deal with the “no ﬁring”
case in the next one.
2.3 The First Period Contract with Firing
Assume ﬁrst that the ﬁrm oﬀers a contract speciﬁying that the agent would be ﬁred if
y1 = 0. The threat of ﬁring will be credible if it induces ﬁrst period eﬀort level e1 such that
Π20 < 0. In this case, the agent’s expected discounted utility u1 is
u1 = ¡g(e1) + P(y1 = 1)(b1 + ±u¤
21) + P(y1 = 0)(0)
= ¡0:5re2
1 + z1e1(b1 + ±u¤
21);
where u¤
21 is given in result 1. The agent’s optimal ﬁrst period eﬀort, e1F, therefore solves
the ﬁrst order condition (FOC)
g0(e1) = re1 = z1(b1 + ±u¤
21) (10)
The ﬁrm’s expected discounted proﬁt is
Π1 = ¡F + P(y1 = 1)(1 ¡ b1 + ±Π¤
21) + P(y1 = 0)(0)
= ¡F + z1(1 ¡ b1 + ±Π¤
21)e1F:
The optimal ﬁrst period contract, b1F, therefore solves the FOC









Next, we consider the case where the ﬁrm does not ﬁre the agent even in the case of
poor ﬁrst period performance.
2.4 The First Period Contract without Firing
Assume that the ﬁrm oﬀers a contract specﬁying that the agent would not be ﬁred even if
y1 = 0. A commitment not to ﬁre will be credible if it induces ﬁrst period eﬀort level e1
10such that Π20 ¸ 0. In this case, the agent’s expected discounted utility u1 is
u1 = ¡g(e1) + P(y1 = 1)(b1 + ±u¤
21) + P(y1 = 0)(0 + ±u¤
20)
= ¡0:5re2
1 + z1e1(b1 + ±u¤
21) + ±(1 ¡ z1e1)u¤
20;
where u¤
20 is given in result 1. The agent’s optimal ﬁrst period eﬀort, e1R, therefore solves
the ﬁrst order condition (FOC)
g0(e1) = re1 = z1(b1 + ±u¤
21) ¡ ±z1u¤





Comparing the ﬁrst order conditions for the agent with and without ﬁring (equations 10
and 12), we get the following results:
Result 2 (i) Any ﬁrst period contract b1 induces greater eﬀort when accompanied by a ﬁr-
ing threat rather than a commitment not to ﬁre.
(ii) If the second order eﬀect d2u20
de2
1
is small, the marginal impact of a given incentive con-
tract b1 on the agent’s eﬀort is lower when accompanied by a ﬁring threat rather than a
commitment not to ﬁre, i.e., de1R
db1 > de1F
db1 . However, the diﬀerence decreases as the learning
eﬀect weakens.
A commitment to rehire implies a lower marginal beneﬁt to eﬀort (in comparison to a
commitment to ﬁre) for two reasons. Firstly, higher eﬀort lowers the probability of failure
and hence of getting a second period utility of u¤
20. This is the incentive eﬀect (i.e. the
ﬁring threat (the stick) acts as a partial substitute for incentives (the carrot) in the ﬁrst
period.). Secondly, higher ﬁrst period eﬀort reduces this minimum second period utility
u¤
20 through its eﬀect on the posterior estimate of the agent’s ability. This is the learning
eﬀect. These two eﬀects imply that the agent’s marginal beneﬁt to eﬀort is lower and this,
combined with the increasing marginal disutility, implies that eﬀort is lower with rehiring.
11While the marginal beneﬁt to eﬀort without ﬁring is lower, in contrast, the rate of change
of the marginal beneﬁt with respect to eﬀort is higher in the “no ﬁring” case, due to learning
eﬀect. This leads to the larger marginal impact of incentives on eﬀort when there is rehiring.
The ﬁrm’s expected discounted proﬁt without ﬁring is
Π1 = ¡F(1 + ±) + P(y1 = 1)(1 ¡ b1 + ±R¤
21) + P(y1 = 0)(0 + R¤
20)
= ¡F(1 + ±) + z1e1R(1 ¡ b1 + 2±u¤





20 from result 1. The optimal ﬁrst period contract, b1R, therefore
solves the FOC
















It is clear from result 2(i) that for the same parameters ±, r, F and q, both ﬁring and
rehiring may be subgame perfect equilibrium strategies for the ﬁrm. For example, the ﬁrm
might induce such high eﬀort, e1F, under ﬁring that the learning eﬀect makes Π20 < 0. The
same ﬁrm might, under rehiring, induce a low enough eﬀort e1R, that the learning eﬀect
is weak and Π20 > 0. We are interested in how the slope of the ﬁrst-period contract, b1,
diﬀers between the two regimes.
Comparing the ﬁrm’s FOCs in the two cases (equations 11 and 13), we note that the
ﬁrst two terms are identical. The next two terms in 13 are negative and are absent from 11.
Of these, the ﬁrst term represents the weakening of incentives as a result of the rehiring
commitment (the incentive eﬀect metioned earlier) and the second term represents the











, the net eﬀect is indeterminate. However, the following
12result gives a suﬃcient condition for the optimal contract with ﬁring to be steeper than the
contract without ﬁring, assuming that both equilibria exist.
Result 3 The ﬁrst period contract under the ﬁring regime is steeper than the contract under
the “no ﬁring” regime, i.e. b1F > b1R, if z1e1R < 1
3.
Thus, the incentive contract with ﬁring is steeper if the unconditional probability of suc-
cess under rehiring is suﬃciently small. The basic intuition is as follows: a strong incentive
eﬀect implies that a rehiring commitment will decrease eﬀort substantially relative to the
eﬀort under a ﬁring threat. This low eﬀort implies that the impact of the learning eﬀect is






is small, leading to a higher slope
b1R relative to b1F .
While the optimal contract in the ﬁring case is easily characterized, the contract in the
rehiring case is the solution to a quartic equation in eﬀort (see Subramanian, Chakraborty
and Sheikh, 2002b). Therefore, result 3 does not lend itself easily to a direct interpretation in
terms of the underlying parameters. We therefore do not present the optimal solutions here.
However, given result 3, it would be interesting to see if the ﬁrms that ﬁre their executives for
poor performance are those oﬀering relatively steeper contracts. In the following empirical
analysis, we examine this question and ﬁnd aﬃrmative results.
3 Data
The data on CEO turnover used in this study is collected from Standard and Poor’s Exe-
cuComp database, for the period 1993-1999. We searched the database for instances where
the identity of the CEO has changed. We were careful not to include those instances where
the identity change was purely short-term and reverses within a year of the change. We also
conducted a detailed search of news items on the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database
13in order to verify that such changes were genuine CEO changes. We dropped CEO identity
changes in the ExecuComp database which were not corroborated by any corresponding
news item in the Lexis-Nexis database. Finally, we omitted ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial sector and
regulated ﬁrms (SIC codes in the range 4910-4949 and 6000-7000).
3.1 Reasons for CEO Change
For each CEO change, we collected information on the date of the CEO change announce-
ment and the reason speciﬁed for the change, from the databases of the Lexis-Nexis Aca-
demic Universe. Based on this search, we found that CEO changes could be classiﬁed
by the cited reason for the change into: (i) Retirement and regular succession related;
(ii) Resignations and other changes explicitly related to poor performance, including those
changes forced by board of directors; (iii) career-related moves to other ﬁrms by the CEO;
(iv) turnover associated with mergers and acquisitions; (v) health related changes; and (vi)
unexplained (in the news) changes. We grouped the changes into three categories, namely
Retirement, Forced Turnover, and Other Changes. Table 1 summarizes these changes by
year and reason. Our ﬁnal sample consists of 8621 ﬁrm-year observations with 705 in-
stances of CEO change (which is a turnover rate of 8.18%). We are interested mainly in
the “Forced Turnover” category, under which are grouped those cases where the news item
either explicitly states or speculates that the CEO was forced out or resigned in light of
poor performance. There are 92 such instances in our sample.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
For each of these ﬁrm-year observations, we collected data on ﬁrm characteristics such
as revenue, income, assets and performance ratios, and CEO characteristics such as the
CEO’s age, tenure with the ﬁrm and comprehensive compensation details from the Exe-
cuComp database. Table 2 summarizes these variables. As the table shows, forced CEO
14changes occur in ﬁrms that, on average, have a low proﬁtability, as measured by the ratio
of net income to sales (NIS), as well as the return on assets (ROA). Such ﬁrms also have
poor stock performance, as indicated by the negative average stock return. Also, the av-
erage CEO who is forced out has had a shorter tenure, is several years younger and owns
a smaller precentage of the the ﬁrm than the average CEO who continues in oﬃce. As
documented in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and in other studies, there is a substan-
tial skewness in the data, with the medians being much lower than the means. However,
we run robustness checks to make sure that our estimation results are not driven by outliers.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
3.2 Measuring Performance
We deﬁne poor ﬁrm performance in several diﬀerent ways and estimate the impact of in-
centives on turnover using each of them. In addition to the usual market-based measure
of performance, namely, stock returns, we also use accounting based measures. As Mur-
phy (1999) documents, companies use accounting based measures of performance to a great
extent in annual incentive plans. We are therefore interested in examining how incentives
based on such measures aﬀect CEO turnover. Our ﬁrst measure is based on the company’s
net income before extraordinary items (NIBEX) in the previous ﬁscal year. While this is an
absolute measure, it is appropriate to the extent that a ﬁrm is unique within an industry.
We believe that such a measure is relevant since running losses or being “in the red” is of-
ten a highly visible signal to the markets and shareholders of poor managerial performance.
The other six deﬁnitions are all relative measures, based on the ﬁrm’s net income to sales
ratio (NIS), the return on assets (ROA) and the one-year stock return (RET1) relative to
the two-digit SIC industry of the ﬁrm.
15In our basic analysis, we use the following deﬁnitions of poor performance (for ﬁrm i in
year t).
￿ NIBEXit < 0.
￿ NISit < NISAV Git, where NISAV Git stands for the average NIS among ﬁrms
with the same 2 digit SIC code as ﬁrm i.
￿ ROAit < ROAAV Git, where ROAAV Git stands for the average ROA among ﬁrms
with the same 2 digit SIC code as ﬁrm i.
￿ RET1it < MRET1t, where MRET1t stands for the return on a market index. The
market index we use is the NASDAQ Composite index if the company is traded on
the NASDAQ market, and the S&P 500 Composite index otherwise.
In addition, we check the robustness of our results to the following deﬁnitions of ﬁrm
performance
￿ NISit < NISQ25it, where NISQ25it stands for the 25th percentile level of NIS
among ﬁrms with the same 2 digit SIC code as ﬁrm i.
￿ ROAit < ROAQ25it, where ROAQ25it stands for the 25th percentile level of ROA
among ﬁrms with the same 2 digit SIC code as ﬁrm i.
￿ RET1it < RET1Q25it, where RET1Q25it stands for the 25th percentile level of
one-year stock returns among ﬁrms with the same 2 digit SIC code as ﬁrm i.
Table 3 gives summary measures of ﬁrm performance around CEO turnovers. As the
table shows, the average ﬁrm whose CEO is forced out has lower proﬁtablility as measured
by ratio of net income before extraordinary items to sales, underperforms the industry in
terms of return on assets and vastly underperforms the market in terms of stock returns,
16in the year preceding the CEO change. The distribution of stock returns among the ﬁrms
in our sample is highly skewed as indicated by the wide diﬀerence between the mean and
median returns.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
3.3 Incentives - Return Sensitivity and Dollar Sensitivity
We concentrate on equity based incentives for measuring CEO incentives. Core, Guay, and
Verrecchia (2000) show, the bulk of the average CEO’s total incentives are equity-based.
Similarly, Hall and Liebman (1998) show that ﬂuctuations in the value of stocks and options
account for about 98% of CEO pay-performance sensitivity. In our data, OLS regressions
similar to regression 1 in Jensen and Murphy (1990a)10 indicate that, for a $1000 change
in ﬁrm value, CEO salary and bonus changes 1.28¢ while total CEO compensation in-
cluding stock and option grants changes 22.11¢, indicating the importance of equity based
incentives. There is an ongoing debate in the literature on how to measure equity-based
incentives11. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990a) and Yermack (1995)
use the dollar change in CEO wealth for a dollar change in ﬁrm value (the Dollar Sensitiv-
ity), while Core and Guay (1999b) use the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage
change in ﬁrm value (the Return Sensitivity). Baker and Hall (1998) argue that the latter
measure is the appropriate one to use when CEO actions aﬀect ﬁrm percentage returns
through control of ﬁrm strategy. We estimate our regressions on each of the two measures
of incentives and ﬁnd similar results.
10The regressions are of the form ∆Ct = a + b∆Vt + et, where ∆Ct is the change in CEO compensation
and ∆Vt is the change in the market value of the ﬁrm over the year t. CEO compensation is measured by
the sum of salary and bonus in the ﬁrst regression, and by the sum of salary, bonus and stock and option
grants in the second regression.
11See Core, Guay and Larcker (2001) for a discussion on the diﬀerent approaches.
17Following Core and Guay (1999b), we calculate incentives in year t as the sum of three
components - (i) portfolio incentives from the CEO’s holdings of shares (ii) incentives from
the CEO’s holdings of unexercised options carried over from past years, and (iii) incentives
from options granted during year t. Incentives from options are measured using Black-
Scholes option sensitivities to stock price. While the disclosures on each year’s grants are
suﬃciently detailed to enable the calculation of the option sensitivities, those on the options
carried over from past grants are not. For the latter options, we use the Core and Guay
(1999a) method to calculate sensitivities. This method uses estimates of the average exercise
price and the average time to maturity, the details of which are summarized in Appendix B.
[TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE.]
Table 4 gives the summary statistics of the diﬀerent components of CEO incentives,
namely, incentives from stocks held, incentives from options granted in the year of the
proxy statement, and incentives from the portfolio of unexercised options carried over from
past years. The distribution of the return sensitivity in our sample closely matches the dis-
tribution given in table 1 of Core and Guay (1999b) for the period 1992-1996 during which
the two samples overlap12. As in Hall and Liebman (1998), there is a substantial skewness
in CEO incentives, with the medians being much lower than the means. The median change
in CEO wealth for a 1% change in ﬁrm value is $191,461. Equivalently, the median change
in CEO wealth is $28.92 for each $1000 change in ﬁrm value13.
12For our raw data, including non-CEO observations, the mean, median and standard deviation of return
sensitivity are $558,205, $122,765 and $3,440,578, while the corresponding numbers from table 1 of Core
and Guay (1999b) are $557,732, $117,434 and $3,680,516 respectively.
13These ﬁgures are substantially higher than the estimates in Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, reﬂecting partly
the huge increase in equity based compensation since 1986, the end of their study period, and partly, the
18Table 5 presents a more detailed analysis of CEO incentives, controlling for performance
and turnover. It gives the break down of the median incentive levels by category of exit,
when the ﬁrm performs poorly and otherwise. As the table shows, the ratio of incentive
levels when ﬁrm performance is good and otherwise is mostly lower for CEOs who are forced
out relative to continuing CEOs, for both measures of sensitivity. Let Ib (Ig) denote the





















This indicates that when the ﬁrm’s performance is poor, CEOs who are forced out are
relatively more incentivized than the continuing CEOs, in comparison to ﬁrms that perform
well. Our regression analysis will examine whether this holds even after controlling for
covariates such as CEO tenure and age.
4 Estimation and Results
We wish to examine whether, conditioning on poor performance, the incidence of forced
turnover increases with the incentive level of CEOs. Therefore, we estimate logit models
of the determinants of forced CEO change among ﬁrms that perform poorly by our various
measures.
P(Forced Turnover) = F(Incentives, CEO Speciﬁc and Firm Speciﬁc Variables) (14)
We are primarily interested in the ceoﬃcient on the incentives variable. The dependent
stock market boom of the ’90s. Indeed, our estimates are closer to those of Hall and Liebman (1998), who
estimate the median return sensitivity to be about $125,000 for the year 1994, compared to $133,352 in our
sample.
19variable in these regressions is an indicator of forced CEO change14. It is an anticipatory
variable measured at ﬁscal year end. Thus, if the CEO change variable is one for a certain
year, it implies that the company’s CEO at the next year end is not the same as the in-
cumbent. We restrict the estimation to CEOs who have held the oﬃce for at least 3 years
prior to the year of change (as in Parrino, 1997). Since the model we use is one of a ﬁrm
learning the CEO’s ability by looking the performance, we believe that the CEO must have
been in oﬃce for at least a few years for the ﬁrm to be able to make a judgment on his or
her abilities15.
In estimating equation 14 above, we control for several factors that jointly aﬀect incen-
tives and turnover. These are:
(i) Firm Size has been shown in the literature to be linked to pay-performance sensitivities
or incentives16. However, larger ﬁrms might also have greater turnover propensity follow-
ing poor performance since they tend to have more independent outside directors on their
boards, as well as a larger talent pool from which to choose a successor (Parrino, 1997).
Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) also suggest that larger ﬁrms have higher turnover rates.
Thus, ﬁrm size eﬀects must be controlled for, so as to avoid a spurious correlation between
incentives and turnover. We use the natural log of sales as the measure of ﬁrm size.
14In these regressions, we include only observations with either no CEO change or a forced change, and
drop instances of CEO change that are for retirement and other reasons. The results are even stronger when
we group the dropped instances in the “no change” category.
15The results do not change when we restrict the estimation to CEOs who have held the oﬃce for at least
2 years prior to the year of change, with dollar sensitivity as the incentive measure. With this restriction,
the results are weaker than those reported with return sensitivity as the incentive measure , but they mostly
retain their signs and signiﬁcance.
16While Jensen and Murphy (1990a) show that this relationship is negative for their measure of incentives,
Core, Guay and Larcker (2001, pp.14) argue that larger ﬁrms might require more talented managers, who
are more highly compensated and are therefore wealthier. This, combined with decreasing absolute risk
aversion leads to higher incentives for CEOs of larger ﬁrms.
20(ii) Firms with higher growth opportunities might oﬀer compensation packages with rel-
atively more stock-options in order induce risk-taking by managers. These opportunities
might also be correlated with performance, as well as with the rates of turnover following
poor performance17. We use the ratio of book value to market value of assets of the ﬁrm
as a proxy for the growth opportunities available to the ﬁrm.
(iii) Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) ﬁnd evidence that higher levels of stock ownership by
top management imply lower sensitivities of turnover to performance. Higher stock own-
ership by the CEO may imply greater levels of entrenchment, making it more diﬃcult for
the board to ﬁre the CEO. Since stock ownership also aﬀects our measure of incentives, we
include CEO stock ownership as a control variable.
(iv) Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show that incentive levels generally increase with the
proximity to retirement of a CEO. This implies a positive relationship between the tenure
or age of the CEO, and incentive levels. Since older CEOs are also more likely to retire
rather than be forced out, we need to include CEO age and tenure as control variables.
(v) The ease of monitoring a ﬁrm’s management, and therefore its CEO incentive levels,
together with its CEO turnover rate, might jointly depend on industry and year-speciﬁc
factors. Therefore we use industry and year dummies in the regressions.
4.1 Baseline Results
Table 6 presents the results using the dollar sensitivity of CEO pay as the measure of
incentives, while table 7 gives the results using the return sensitivity of CEO pay as the
measure of incentives. The ﬁrst panel (columns 1 through 4) in each table gives the results
for the full sample, while the second panel (columns 5 through 8) gives the rsults for the
sample without outliers (discussed below). The four columns of each panel correspond to
four diﬀerent deﬁnitions of poor ﬁrm performance. Thus column 1 gives the estimates for
17For example, high growth ﬁrms might understand that there is greater risk of failure associated with
new ventures, and therefore, may not punish the manager for failure as readily as a low growth ﬁrm.
21ﬁrms whose net income before extraordinary items was negative over the previous year,
column 2 gives the estimates for ﬁrms with NISt < NISAV Gt, column 3 for ﬁrms with
ROA < ROAAV G and column 4 for ﬁrms with RET1 < MRET1.
The tables show that incentives have a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of forced turnover.
The coeﬃcient on the dollar sensitivity of CEO pay is signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the NIS
measure of performance, and at the 1% level for the other three measures. The results may
be best understood in terms of the percentage change in probability of ﬁring at diﬀerent
incentive levels in the distribution. Table 8 presents these calculations for the median ﬁrm
in the sample. As the table shows, the probability that the CEO will be ﬁred following a
year in which the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability (NIS) is below the industry mean level is 16.39% higher
for CEOs at the 60th percentile level of dollar sensitivity as compared to CEOs at the 40th
percentile level. Similarly, at a ﬁrm whose stock underperforms the market in a given year,
the probability that the CEO will be ﬁred is 15.86% higher for CEOs at the 60th percentile
level of dollar sensitivity as compared to CEOs at the 40th percentile level. These eﬀects are
quite strong, even if the absolute probabilities of ﬁring are low. Corresponding eﬀects for a
change in incentive level from the median level to 60th percentile level are 10.71% at a ﬁrm
with an ROA below the industry average, and 10.28% at a ﬁrm whose stock underperforms
the market.
[TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE.]
The estimates using return sensitivity (table 7) also indicate the positive impact of in-
centives on forced turnover. The coeﬃcient on incentives is signiﬁcant at the 10% level for
ﬁrms making a net loss and for ﬁrms with below industry levels of ROA. While the coeﬃ-
cient with performance based on stock returns is of the opposite sign, it is not signiﬁcant
(p-value=0.92). Table 8 presents the corresponding marginal impact calculations for the
22median ﬁrm in the sample. The table indicates that the probability that the CEO will be
ﬁred is 2.07% higher for CEOs at the 60th percentile level of return sensitivity as compared
to CEOs at the 40th percentile level, at a poor proﬁtability ﬁrm (NIS). The corresponding
ﬁgure is 1.11% at a ﬁrm with ROA below industry average. Table 8 demonstrates that the
results are weaker when incentives are measured using return sensitivity rather than dollar
sensitivity. One interpretation of this might be that the dollar sensitivity of CEO pay is a
more accurate measure of the performance pressure faced by a CEO.
The coeﬃcients on the control variables in these regressions are generally of the expected
signs. The book to market ratio has a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of forced turnover,
which supports the argument that ﬁrms with higher growth opportunities (and lower BTM)
understand the inherent risks in these opportunities and do not ﬁre CEOs as readily as more
stable ﬁrms. CEO stock ownership has a negative eﬀect on the likelihood of being ﬁred for
poor performance, a result that echoes Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997). CEOs with longer
tenure are also less likely to be ﬁred for poor performance, which is another indicator of
entrenchment eﬀects. Firm size and CEO age do not seem to have a signiﬁcant impact on
forced turnover.
4.2 Eﬀect of Outliers
One concern that naturally arises given the skewness of the distribution of incentives in
the sample is the eﬀect of outliers. Are the results mainly due a few CEOs with extreme
incentive levels who were ﬁred for poor performance or are they valid for the entire sample?
To address this issue, we drop those observations at the 1% tails of the sample, which cuts the
skewness in third, and repeat the estimations. These estimates, given in the second panels
((columns 5 through 8) of tables 6 and 7, show that dropping the outliers only reinforces
the baseline results. Incentives have signiﬁcantly positive impact on the likelihood of forced
23turnover - the coeﬃcients on the dollar sensitivity of CEO pay are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level for all four measures of ﬁrm performance, while those on the return sensitivity are
signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the three accounting measures and inconclusive with the
stock return measure. Thus, outliers do not seem to be driving the main result.
4.3 Results for the Worst Performers
In order to further check whether our results are dependent on our deﬁnition of poor per-
formance, we examine the impact of incentives on forced turnover among the ﬁrms that
perform very poorly relative to their industry. These are deﬁned to be ﬁrms that are in the
lowest quartile of their industry in terms of each of three performance measures, namely,
NIS, ROA and stock returns. Columns 1 through 3 of table 9 contain the estimates for
the full sample, and columns 4 through 6, for the sample without outliers, using dollar
sensitivity as the incentive measure. Table 10 presents the estimates with the return sensi-
tivity as the performance measure. The results are largely identical to the earlier estimates
- the coeﬃcient on dollar incentives is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better.
The coeﬃcient on return sensitivity is always positive, and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level
with NIS as the performance measure. When incentive outliers are dropped, the results
are strengthened, with a consistently positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on incentives for all
measures of performance. CEO stock ownership and CEO tenure continue to have signiﬁ-
cantly negative eﬀects, and BTM, a positive eﬀect, on the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.
[TABLES 9 AND 10 HERE.]
We also repeated the regressions after redeﬁning poor performers to be those that are
in the lower half of their industry (rather than the lowest quartile) in terms of each of three
performance measures, namely, NIS, ROA and stock returns. The results (not reported
24here) are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level with dollar sensitivity as the incentive
measure, but not signiﬁcant when return sensitivity is used as the incentive measure.
4.4 Past Performance
One potential problem with the speciﬁcation of equation 14 is that it assumes that ﬁrms
decide on whether to ﬁre their CEOs or not based only on the performance in the most
recent year. Before addressing this issue more rigorously, we argue at the outset that such
misspeciﬁcation is not likely to be driving the results. Assume ﬁrst that lagged performance
is actually an omitted variable that is driving the results. In order to do so, it must be
positively correlated with both incentives and the ﬁring decision. For example, it may be
the case that those ﬁrms that ﬁre their CEOs for poor performance in a given year do so, not
because their incentives were high, but because the performance in the previous year was
also poor. Then the positive correlation of ﬁring with incentives must be due to a positive
correlation between incentives and the likelihood of two consecutive years (or more) of poor
performance. Such a systematic negative correlation between incentives and performance
is an unlikely prospect, in theory as well as reality.
In order to be convinced that lagged performance was not a factor driving the results,
we repeated the regressions after including the performance in the previous year in the
regressions. Table 11 presents the estimates. The results clearly indicate that lagged per-
formance is not an important determinant of the link between incentives and ﬁring. In




Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show that the pay-performance sensitivity of executives is
closely related to the volatility of stock prices of the ﬁrm. Executives at ﬁrms with higher
stock price volatility face greater risks, and given executive risk aversion, this implies that
such ﬁrms do not link executive pay to performance as readily as less risky ﬁrms. However,
Core and Guay (forthcoming) argue that controlling for ﬁrm size reverses the Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999) result, and that, consistent with Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) prediction,
that controlling for ﬁrm size, there is an increasing relation between risk and the pay-
performance sensitivity. These results indicate that the volatility of performance may be an
important variable to be included in any estimation of the relationship between incentives,
performance and turnover. Accordingly, we repeated the regressions controlling for the
volatility of performance. The control variable we used was the Black-Scholes volatility
measure of the stock based on 60 month stock returns, a variable that was readily available
in the ExecuComp dataset. Table 12 presents these estimates. The results are similar to
the baseline results - the coeﬃcient on the dollar sensitivity of CEO pay is positive and
signiﬁcant at over the 5% level for all four measures of performance, while the coeﬃcient
on the return sensitivity is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level or higher for the net
loss and ROA measures of performance, and insigniﬁcant otherwise.
[TABLE 12 HERE.]
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the issue of the ﬁring threat and its relationship to the optimal
incentive contract in the context of the principal-agent relationship. We ﬁrst derive some
theoretical results on the relationship between the optimal incentive contract and the like-
lihood of being ﬁred for poor performance. We then examine the empirical evidence on the
26incidence of forced turnover among CEOs with diﬀerent compensation contracts. We ﬁnd
that CEOs with higher incentives are also more likely to be ﬁred for poor performance.
Deﬁning a year of poor performance to be one in which the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability (NIS) is
below the industry average level, we ﬁnd that a CEO receiving performance based incentives
(measured by the dollar sensitivity) at the 60th percentile level is 16.39% more likely to be
ﬁred following a year of poor performance as compared to a CEO with incentives at the 40th
percentile level. The corresponding ﬁgure with a year of poor performance deﬁned to be
one in which the ROA is below the industry average level is 15.07%, and with a year of poor
performance deﬁned to be one in which the ﬁrm’s stock return is below the market return
is 15.86%. While the results are weaker with return sensitivity as the incentive measure,
they are nevertheless signiﬁcantly positive for most measures of ﬁrm performance.
We do not argue that these eﬀects are very important from the manager’s point of view.
Indeed, as Jensen and Murphy (1990a) point out, dismissals are not an important source of
managerial incentives. Firms nevertheless do ﬁre their CEOs following poor performance,
and we attempt to understand how this is related to the issue of incentives. We argue that if
ﬁrms learn suﬃciently about the ability of a manager by observing performance, they may
ﬁre managers who perform poorly after being incentivized. Our empirical analysis bears
this out. Firms do seem to consider the level of incentives oﬀered in deciding on whether
to penalize a CEO for poor performance. CEOs with greater incentives also face greater
performance pressures and have less secure jobs.
27Appendix A
Proof of Result 2
(i) Comparing equations 10 and 12, we note that the right hand side (RHS) of 12 has all
the terms in the RHS of 10 plus two additional negative terms. (Condition 9, combined
with the condition that (1 ¡ z1e1) 2 [0;1], implies that the last term in the RHS of 12 is
negative.) Hence result 2 (i).






































From 15 and 17, given that
du¤
20
de1R < 0, we have result 2 (ii).
Proof of Result 3
Combining equations 11 and 13, we get





















28Substituting for e1F and e1R from equations 10 and 12, and for de1F
db1F and de1R
db1F from equations
15 and 17, and rearranging terms, we get



































Further manipulation of the above expression leads to
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The term in the ﬁrst square brackets is negative in any equilibrium involving rehiring since
rehiring implies that Π¤
20 > 0. This, combined with condition 9, implies that (b1R¡b1F) < 0
if the term in the second square brackets is positive. Hence result 3.
Appendix B
Below, we describe brieﬂy the method used to calculate CEO incentive levels (for full
details, see Core and Guay, 1999b). CEO wealth consists of a portfolio of stock and options.
Return Sensitivity is deﬁned as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock
price, while Dollar Sensitivity is deﬁned as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a dollar
change in stock price. If W denotes CEO wealth in options and stocks held, and and V
denotes ﬁrm value, then,
29Return Sensitivity = r = 0:01 ¤ dW=(dV
V ); and
Dollar Sensitivity = (dW
dV ) = 100¤r
V .
The sensitivity of a stock portfolio to a 1% change in stock price is just 1% of the stock
portfolio value. As for the option portfolio, we use the Black-Scholes model incorporating
dividends to estimate sensitivities (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973). This is in
line with prior research by Jensen and Murphy (1990), Yermack (1995), Hall and Liebman
(1998) and Core and Guay (1999b). The sensitivity of an option’s value to a 1% change in
the stock price is the option delta multiplied by 0:01P, where P is the stock price. Thus,
denoting the number of shares and options held by Ns and No,
Stock Portfolio Return Sensitivity = 0:01 ¤ NsP.
Option Portfolio Return Sensitivity = 0:01 ¤ ±NoP.
To calculate the option delta, we need the stock price, exercise price, time to maturity,
expected stock return volatility, expected dividend yield, and the risk-free rate. For each
ﬁscal year, ﬁrms are required to disclose the exercise price and time to maturity for options
that are granted in that particular year. Therefore, the option delta is readily calculated
for these options. However, for options granted in previous years, such details are not
available and would have to be collected from past proxy statements. Core and Guay (1999a)
present a simpliﬁed method for calculating the values of options granted in past years using
information from only the latest proxy statement. This involves (i) Approximating the
exercise price with the year-end price minus the current realizable value per option and (ii)
Setting the time to maturity of unexercisable options to one year less than time to maturity
of most recent year’s grant (or nine years if no new grant was made), and of exercisable
options to three years less than time to maturity of unexercisable options (or six years if
no new grant was made). Core and Guay (1999a) show that this method yields estimates
of option portfolio sensitivities that are 99% correlated with the measures that would be
obtained if the parameters of a CEO’s option portfolio were known.
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34Table 1: CEO Changes, by reason for the change
CEO changes between 1993-1999 in the ExecuComp database classiﬁed by the reason for the change. A
CEO change is deﬁned as a change in the identity of the CEO in the ExecuComp database. The reason
for the change was identiﬁed through a search of the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database for news
announcements on the change. CEO changes on account of death, illness, corporate control changes and
moves to other ﬁrms are omitted, as are changes that could not be cross-checked through news reports.
Only ﬁrms in the non-ﬁnancial sector and non-regulated industries are included. Data Source: ExecuComp,
1993-1999 & Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
Year No Change Retirement Forced Other Total
1993 813 35 3 2 853
1994 1076 70 12 14 1172
1995 1137 71 15 20 1243
1996 1176 55 15 30 1276
1997 1190 89 13 20 1312
1998 1247 74 18 23 1362
1999 1277 93 18 15 1403
Total 7916 487 94 124 8621Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Descriptive Statistics of the key variables used in the estimation. Total compensation includes salary, bonus,
other annual compensation, restricted stock and stock options exercised during the year and long term
incentive payouts. Stock options are valued using the Black-Scholes method. Data Source: ExecuComp,
1993-1999.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
No CEO Change
Sales ($ mn) 3441.79 891.19 9785.96
Market Value ($ mn) 4791.73 914.57 16661.99
Book to Market 0.60 0.60 0.27
Return on Assets (%) 4.21 5.51 13.25
Stock Return (%) 32.62 12.09 710.76
Age of CEO (Years) 55.52 56.00 7.79
Tenure of CEO (Years) 7.04 5.00 7.02
Total Compensation ($ ’000) 2981.98 1141.55 12566.87
Ownership (%) 4.57 1.70 7.74
Forced Change
Sales ($ mn) 4870.17 1097.55 9062.87
Market Value ($ mn) 6854.70 850.34 21171.79
Book to Market 0.70 0.68 0.29
Return on Assets (%) -5.08 1.30 22.76
Stock Return (%) -12.88 -12.11 35.92
Age of CEO (Years) 53.24 54.00 5.94
Tenure of CEO (Years) 5.12 4.00 4.10
Total Compensation ($ ’000) 2399.70 978.33 3326.24
Ownership (%) 1.64 0.62 2.49
Full Sample
Sales ($ mn) 3557.26 923.13 10100.52
Market Value ($ mn) 4915.48 930.56 17352.74
Book to Market 0.61 0.60 0.27
Return on Assets (%) 4.00 5.42 13.51
Stock Return (%) 31.19 11.08 685.16
Age of CEO (Years) 55.97 56.00 7.85
Tenure of CEO (Years) 7.18 5.00 7.08
Total Compensation ($ ’000) 2995.66 1152.80 12151.13
Ownership (%) 4.48 1.66 7.62
36Table 3: Firm Performance Around Turnovers
Measures of ﬁrm performance in the previous ﬁscal year. NIS is the ratio of Net Income (before adjustments
for extraordinary items) to Sales, ROA is the return on assets, and RET1, the stock return over the
previous ﬁscal year. NISAV G and ROAAV G are the average NIS and ROA of the 2-digit SIC industry
to which the ﬁrm belongs. MRET1 is the return, over the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year, on the NASDAQ Composite
Index if the ﬁrm is traded on the NASDAQ market, and on the S&P 500 Composite Index otherwise. Data
Source: ExecuComp, 1993-1999.
Change NIS ¡ NISAV G ROA ¡ ROAAV G RET1 ¡ MRET1
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
No Change -0.30 2.44 0.25 1.34 7.95 -8.33
Forced -0.42 -1.93 -8.96 -2.83 -38.59 -34.64
Full Sample -0.29 2.35 0.05 1.24 6.56 -9.44
Table 4: Components of CEO Incentives
Total Sensitivity is the change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in ﬁrm wealth. It is calculated as the
sum of the sensitivities of the 3 components of the CEO’s portfolio - shares, options granted this year
(current options) and the portfolio of unexercised options carried over from past years. The sensitivity of
the portfolio of unexercised past options is calculated using the Core and Guay (1999a) method. Dollar
sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a dollar change in ﬁrm value. The full sample includes
CEO changes for retirement and other reasons.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
No CEO Change
Share Sensitivity ($’000) 913.45 62.68 10369.34
Curr. Option Sensitivity ($’000) 47.34 9.85 238.50
Old Option Sensitivity ($’000) 176.56 50.42 620.46
Total Sensitivity ($’000) 1067.87 193.18 9168.87
Dollar Sensitivity ($ per $1000) 58.68 29.47 82.46
Forced Turnover
Share Sensitivity ($’000) 87.81 22.41 175.14
Curr. Option Sensitivity ($’000) 44.58 3.78 194.50
Old Option Sensitivity ($’000) 186.27 54.38 584.95
Total Sensitivity ($’000) 328.31 130.39 754.22
Dollar Sensitivity ($ per $1000) 32.72 21.45 50.31
Full Sample
Share Sensitivity ($’000) 970.38 62.22 12626.30
Curr. Option Sensitivity ($’000) 45.92 9.29 230.30
Old Option Sensitivity ($’000) 174.89 50.48 603.70
Total Sensitivity ($’000) 1134.25 191.46 11887.59
Dollar Sensitivity ($ per $1000) 57.57 28.92 81.15
37Table 5: Incentive Levels, by Performance and Turnover
Median incentive levels of CEOs, by CEO change category and ﬁrm performance. Return Sensitivity is
the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in ﬁrm wealth. Dollar Sensitivity is the dollar change
in CEO wealth for a dollar change in ﬁrm value. NIS is the ratio of Net Income (before adjustments for
extraordinary items) to Sales, ROA is the return on assets, and RET1, the stock return over the previous
ﬁscal year. NISAV G and ROAAV G are the average NIS and ROA of the 2-digit SIC industry to which
the ﬁrm belongs. MRET1 is the return, over the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year, on the NASDAQ Composite Index if
the ﬁrm is traded on the NASDAQ market, and on the S&P 500 Composite Index otherwise.
Dollar Sensitivity Return Sensitivity
No Change Forced No Change Forced
Net Proﬁt 218.60 121.64 29.25 19.55
Net Loss 93.55 81.60 31.36 23.79
Ratio 2.34 1.49 0.93 0.82
NIS ¸ NISAV G 246.58 152.72 29.04 17.76
NIS < NISAV G 121.53 74.31 30.44 23.09
Ratio 2.03 2.06 0.95 0.77
ROA ¸ ROAAV G 252.58 196.39 28.91 13.72
ROA < ROAAV G 129.44 97.88 30.37 24.16
Ratio 1.95 2.01 0.95 0.57
RET1 ¸ MRET1 262.46 59.38 29.22 16.42
RET1 < MRET1 157.09 134.08 29.54 21.51
Ratio 1.67 0.44 0.99 0.76
38Table 6: Dollar Sensitivity and Forced Turnover - I
Logit estimation of the factors aﬀecting the probability of CEO turnover among ﬁrms that perform poorly.
Incentives are measured by the dollar change in CEO wealth (including stock and options) for a dollar
change in ﬁrm value, measured at prior ﬁscal year-end. Columns 1 and 5 present estimates for ﬁrms whose
net income before extraordinary items was negative over the previous year, columns 2 and 6 for ﬁrms whose
ratio of net income to sales (NIS) was below the 2-digit SIC industry average over the previous year, columns
3 and 7 for ﬁrms whose ROA over the previous year was less than industry average, and columns 4 and 8 for
ﬁrms whose previous year stock returns (RET1) were below the relevant index returns. Columns 1 through 4
are for the full sample and columns 5 through 8 are for the sample without outliers. The dependent variable
is zero if there is no turnover and 1 if the CEO is forced out for performance related reasons. BTM is the
ratio of book to market values of the assets of the ﬁrm. Age and tenure pertain to the CEO. Industry and
year dummies not reported. p-values in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, * signiﬁcant at 5%; ***
signiﬁcant at 1%. Data Source: ExecuComp, 1993-1999.
Full Sample Without Outliers
Net Low Low Low Net Low Low Low
Loss NIS ROA RET1 Loss NIS ROA RET1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Sales 0.278 -0.034 -0.057 0.072 0.281 0.028 -0.012 0.089
(0.312) (0.865) (0.730) (0.560) (0.317) (0.895) (0.941) (0.445)
BTM 0.576 2.271** 1.917** 1.356* 0.525 2.432** 2.078** 1.523**
(0.723) (0.022) (0.038) (0.072) (0.746) (0.020) (0.029) (0.049)
Age 0.074* 0.02 0.038 0.024 0.074** 0.032 0.044* 0.038
(0.054) (0.476) (0.147) (0.366) (0.046) (0.263) (0.080) (0.138)
Ownership -0.412*** -0.234*** -0.260*** -0.222*** -0.419*** -0.287*** -0.304*** -0.289***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure -0.07 -0.083** -0.091** -0.069** -0.051 -0.090** -0.095** -0.085***
(0.191) (0.046) (0.030) (0.033) (0.448) (0.035) (0.028) (0.010)
Incentives 25.570*** 9.012** 10.158*** 8.132*** 26.235*** 16.146*** 15.672*** 17.114***
(0.000) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant -7.050** -16.973*** -17.254 -18.635*** -5.581** -20.351*** -18.105*** -20.012
(0.022) (0.000) (.) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (.)
No. of Obs. 141 539 629 1463 139 530 618 1431
39Table 7: Return Sensitivity and Forced Turnover - I
Logit estimation of the factors aﬀecting the probability of CEO turnover among ﬁrms that perform poorly.
Incentives are measured by the dollar change in CEO wealth (including stock and options) for a 1% change in
ﬁrm value, measured at prior ﬁscal year-end. Columns 1 and 5 present estimates for ﬁrms whose net income
before extraordinary items was negative over the previous year, columns 2 and 6 for ﬁrms whose ratio of net
income to sales (NIS) was below the 2-digit SIC industry average over the previous year, columns 3 and 7
for ﬁrms whose ROA over the previous year was less than industry average, and columns 4 and 8 for ﬁrms
whose previous year stock returns (RET1) were below the relevant index returns. Columns 1 through 4 are
for the full sample and columns 5 through 8 are for the sample without outliers. The dependent variable
is zero if there is no turnover and 1 if the CEO is forced out for performance related reasons. BTM is the
ratio of book to market values of the assets of the ﬁrm. Age and tenure pertain to the CEO. Industry and
year dummies not reported. p-values in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%;
*** signiﬁcant at 1%. Data Source: ExecuComp, 1993-1999.
Full Sample Without Outliers
Net Low Low Low Net Low Low Low
Loss NIS ROA RET1 Loss NIS ROA RET1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Sales -0.0248 -0.101 -0.1226 0.0337 -0.0782 -0.1311 -0.1441 0.0214
(0.921) (0.614) (0.458) (0.797) (0.782) (0.527) (0.385) (0.883)
BTM 0.2141 2.1102** 1.7818* 1.3052* 0.691 2.3292** 1.9847** 1.3754*
(0.891) (0.040) (0.067) (0.094) (0.646) (0.021) (0.033) (0.087)
Age 0.0385 0.0082 0.025 0.0173 0.0464 0.0116 0.0253 0.0181
(0.449) (0.810) (0.441) (0.568) (0.326) (0.719) (0.443) (0.539)
Ownership -0.2784* -0.1552** -0.1828** -0.1386* -0.1803* -0.1712** -0.2078** -0.1448*
(0.085) (0.027) (0.013) (0.059) (0.060) (0.016) (0.010) (0.061)
Tenure -0.0537 -0.0909** -0.0921** -0.0632* -0.0666 -0.1170** -0.0992** -0.0640*
(0.311) (0.041) (0.037) (0.061) (0.275) (0.041) (0.024) (0.067)
Incentives 0.3652* 0.1737 0.0901* -0.0051 0.0010** 0.4691** 0.3120** 0.0619
(x 10
¡3) (0.054) (0.199) (0.090) (0.915) (0.017) (0.036) (0.034) (0.774)
Constant -1.1505 -17.9903 -15.1047 -16.9214 -1.6334 -18.8869 -15.676 -17.9620***
(0.728) (.) (.) (.) (0.591) (.) (.) (0.000)
No. of Obs. 143 538 632 1464 142 534 624 1445
40Table 8: Marginal Eﬀect of Incentives on Forced Turnover
The table gives the percentage increase in the probability of being ﬁred following poor ﬁrm performance,
for the median CEO, as the incentive levels increase from the 40th percentile level or the median level to
the 60th percentile level. Dollar sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a dollar change in ﬁrm
value. Return Sensitivity is the change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in ﬁrm wealth. NIS is the ratio of
net income to sales and RET1 is the return on the ﬁrm’s stock over its ﬁscal year.
Dollar Sensitivity Return Sensitivity
40th Median 40th Median
to 60th to 60th to 60th to 60th
Net Loss 26.55 19.55 3.51 1.62
Low NIS 16.39 10.71 2.07 1.22
Low ROA 15.07 9.60 1.11 0.66
Low RET1 15.86 10.28 - -
Table 9: Dollar Sensitivity and Forced Turnover - II
Logit estimation of the factors aﬀecting the probability of CEO turnover among ﬁrms that perform poorly.
Incentives are measured by the dollar change in CEO wealth (including stock and options) for a dollar change
in ﬁrm value, measured at prior ﬁscal year-end. Poor performance is deﬁned as being in the lowest quartile
of the industry in terms of ratio of net income to sales (NIS) for the estimations in columns 1 and 2, ROA
for columns 3 and 4, and stock returns (RET1) for columns 5 and 6. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are for the full
sample and columns 2, 4 and 6 are for the sample without outliers. The dependent variable is zero if there
is no turnover and 1 if the CEO is forced out for performance related reasons. BTM is the ratio of book to
market values of the assets of the ﬁrm. Age and tenure pertain to the CEO. Industry and year dummies
not reported. p-values in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%. Data Source: ExecuComp, 1993-1999.
Full Sample Without Outliers
Low Low Low Low Low Low
NIS ROA RET1 NIS ROA RET1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Sales 0.0139 -0.0069 0.0387 0.014 0.0042 0.0972
(0.944) (0.970) (0.803) (0.944) (0.981) (0.544)
BTM 0.7314 -0.0364 1.0592 0.7299 -0.0823 1.1963
(0.423) (0.973) (0.188) (0.424) (0.939) (0.154)
Age 0.0486* 0.0616** 0.0476 0.0486* 0.0625** 0.0524
(0.069) (0.035) (0.158) (0.069) (0.033) (0.131)
Ownership -0.3259*** -0.3641*** -0.2294*** -0.3263*** -0.3710*** -0.2781***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Tenure -0.1111*** -0.1023*** -0.1354*** -0.1100*** -0.1050*** -0.1369**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Incentives 13.9814** 16.3016*** 9.4660** 13.9906** 16.0846*** 15.3021***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.033) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -4.9330** -4.1820* -20.5131*** -5.7756** -3.7149 -19.6822
(0.043) (0.059) (0.000) (0.013) (0.120) (.)
No. of Obs. 328 328 526 322 322 519
41Table 10: Return Sensitivity and Forced Turnover - II
Logit estimation of the factors aﬀecting the probability of CEO turnover among ﬁrms that perform poorly.
Incentives are measured by the dollar change in CEO wealth (including stock and options) for a 1% change
in ﬁrm value, measured at prior ﬁscal year-end. Poor performance is deﬁned as being in the lowest quartile
of the industry in terms of ratio of net income to sales (NIS) for the estimations in columns 1 and 2, ROA
for columns 3 and 4, and stock returns (RET1) for columns 5 and 6. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are for the full
sample and columns 2, 4 and 6 are for the sample without outliers. The dependent variable is zero if there
is no turnover and 1 if the CEO is forced out for performance related reasons. BTM is the ratio of book to
market values of the assets of the ﬁrm. Age and tenure pertain to the CEO. Industry and year dummies
not reported. p-values in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%. Data Source: ExecuComp, 1993-1999.
Full Sample Without Outliers
Low Low Low Low Low Low
NIS ROA RET1 NIS ROA RET1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Sales -0.1778 -0.1202 -0.0312 -0.1778 -0.169 -0.0934
(0.332) (0.477) (0.838) (0.332) (0.342) (0.555)
BTM 0.649 -0.1635 0.9176 0.649 0.0482 1.2559
(0.441) (0.876) (0.313) (0.441) (0.960) (0.130)
Age 0.0385 0.04 0.0371 0.0385 0.044 0.0406
(0.233) (0.246) (0.332) (0.233) (0.177) (0.262)
Ownership -0.2367*** -0.2239** -0.1354** -0.2367*** -0.2355*** -0.1707***
(0.006) (0.018) (0.040) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Tenure -0.1332*** -0.1047*** -0.1315** -0.1332*** -0.1253*** -0.1538**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014)
Incentives (x 10
¡3) 0.6552** 0.0768 0.0056 0.6552** 0.5475** 0.3954*
(0.011) (0.233) (0.684) (0.011) (0.035) (0.061)
Constant -1.5249 -1.8591 -17.1974*** -1.5249 -2.0572 -19.2927
(0.556) (0.470) (0.000) (0.556) (0.403) (.)
No. of Obs. 326 327 522 326 325 515
42Table 11: Results with Lagged Performance
Logit estimation of the factors aﬀecting the probability of CEO turnover among ﬁrms that perform poorly.
Dollar Sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth (including stock and options) for a dollar change
in ﬁrm value, and Return Sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in ﬁrm value.
Columns 1 and 5 present estimates for ﬁrms whose net income before extraordinary items was negative over
the previous year, columns 2 and 6 for ﬁrms whose ratio of net income to sales (NIS) was below the 2-digit
SIC industry average over the previous year, columns 3 and 7 for ﬁrms whose ROA over the previous year
was less than industry average, and columns 4 and 8 for ﬁrms whose previous year stock returns (RET1)
were below the relevant index returns. The dependent variable is zero if there is no turnover and 1 if the
CEO is forced out for performance related reasons. BTM is the ratio of book to market values of the assets
of the ﬁrm. Age and tenure pertain to the CEO. Lag Perf is the one year lagged performance of the ﬁrm
by the relevant measure. Industry and year dummies not reported. p-values in parentheses. * indicates
signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Data Source: ExecuComp, 1993-1999.
Dollar Sensitivity Return Sensitivity
Net Low Low Low Net Low Low Low
Loss NIS ROA RET1 Loss NIS ROA RET1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Sales -0.302 -0.073 -0.090 0.069 -0.458* -0.276 -0.172 0.023
(0.316) (0.722) (0.589) (0.578) (0.064) (0.223) (0.301) (0.855)
BTM 1.899 2.182** 1.870** 0.964 1.039 2.501** 1.761* 0.921
(0.265) (0.027) (0.034) (0.258) (0.483) (0.012) (0.070) (0.286)
Age 0.106*** 0.026 0.039 0.024 0.051 0.026 0.026 0.017
(0.002) (0.370) (0.142) (0.375) (0.312) (0.381) (0.432) (0.577)
Ownership -0.589*** -0.238*** -0.263*** -0.213** -0.426** -0.237*** -0.208*** -0.135*
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.012) (0.033) (0.007) (0.010) (0.061)
Tenure -0.066 -0.081** -0.088** -0.068** -0.042 -0.102* -0.085** -0.063*
(0.250) (0.046) (0.030) (0.040) (0.454) (0.053) (0.042) (0.063)
Incentives 34.303*** 8.127** 9.611** 7.909*** 0.531** 0.742*** 0.115** 0.008
(0.000) (0.032) (0.015) (0.009) (0.033) (0.005) (0.040) (0.719)
Lag Perf 0.006* 3.303 0.023 -0.005 0.004 2.971 0.022 -0.005
(0.051) (0.311) (0.619) (0.271) (0.119) (0.387) (0.639) (0.291)
Constant -7.792** -18.484 -17.977 -17.544*** -2.682 -17.945 -16.095 -17.305***
(0.028) (.) (.) (0.000) (0.506) (.) (.) (0.000)
No. of Obs. 135 495 577 1364 135 495 577 1364
43Table 12: Results with Volatility
Logit estimation of the factors aﬀecting the probability of CEO turnover among ﬁrms that perform poorly.
Dollar Sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth (including stock and options) for a dollar change
in ﬁrm value, and Return Sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in ﬁrm value.
Columns 1 and 5 present estimates for ﬁrms whose net income before extraordinary items was negative over
the previous year, columns 2 and 6 for ﬁrms whose ratio of net income to sales (NIS) was below the 2-digit
SIC industry average over the previous year, columns 3 and 7 for ﬁrms whose ROA over the previous year
was less than industry average, and columns 4 and 8 for ﬁrms whose previous year stock returns (RET1)
were below the relevant index returns. The dependent variable is zero if there is no turnover and 1 if the
CEO is forced out for performance related reasons. BTM is the ratio of book to market values of the assets of
the ﬁrm. Age and tenure pertain to the CEO. Volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns measured
over 60 months. Industry and year dummies not reported. p-values in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcant
at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Data Source: ExecuComp, 1993-1999.
Dollar Sensitivity Return Sensitivity
Net Low Low Low Net Low Low Low
Loss NIS ROA RET1 Loss NIS ROA RET1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Sales -0.002 -0.043 -0.065 0.111 -0.365 -0.114 -0.13 0.062
(0.995) (0.837) (0.699) (0.380) (0.227) (0.579) (0.440) (0.645)
BTM 0.917 2.316** 1.954** 1.280* 0.267 2.173** 1.822* 1.24
(0.686) (0.021) (0.034) (0.090) (0.876) (0.032) (0.059) (0.114)
Age 0.088* 0.026 0.044 0.03 0.062 0.014 0.031 0.024
(0.083) (0.399) (0.109) (0.282) (0.304) (0.689) (0.360) (0.434)
Ownership -0.465*** -0.233*** -0.260*** -0.229*** -0.358* -0.157** -0.185** -0.136*
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.074) (0.022) (0.011) (0.065)
Tenure -0.078 -0.086** -0.094** -0.071** -0.067 -0.092** -0.094** -0.064*
(0.219) (0.039) (0.023) (0.027) (0.278) (0.033) (0.030) (0.057)
Incentives 29.621*** 9.054** 10.178*** 9.389** 0.480** 0.194 0.092* -0.007
(0.000) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.041) (0.201) (0.092) (0.908)
Volatility -5.384 0.169 0.259 0.796 -3.894 0.228 0.305 0.82
(0.191) (0.846) (0.685) (0.129) (0.279) (0.783) (0.624) (0.120)
Constant -1.5 -19.139*** -17.659*** -19.669*** 1.463 -18.448 -16.266 -18.786***
(0.740) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.729) (.) (.) (0.000)
No. of Obs. 137 526 614 1403 137 523 615 1406
44